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Western Corporate Forms and the  
Social Origins of Chinese Diaspora 
Entrepreneurial Networks
Wai-keung Chung
Introduction
It is undebatable that the economic growth of the last few decades in Southeast 
Asia can largely be attributed to the business activities of the Chinese diaspora.1 
The ethnic Chinese, who constitute fewer than 10 per cent of the population 
in Southeast Asia, hold a signiﬁcant proportion of its wealth. While different 
perspectives are available to explain this economic miracle created by the Chinese, 
one major argument is that the success of the Chinese can be attributed to their 
unique pattern of business organization. This pattern of organization has created 
what some scholars would call a ‘network-based economy’, as opposed to a ‘ﬁrm-
based economy’ that is commonly found in many Western economies.2
A network-based economy is an economy based on relational networks 
– economic actors connect to each other through various personal networks. 
Because of the functionalities of the networks, it is the networks, rather than the 
individual ﬁrms, that are the key contributors to the economy. Firms, in this case, 
are therefore embedded in networks. Conversely, in a ﬁrm-based economy, there 
are individual ﬁrms in the market that are competing with each other to maximize 
their proﬁts. Firms are the key contributors of the economy, and networks, if 
they ever exist, are secondary. Through legal individuation of economic actors, 
networking becomes a functional strategy between individual ﬁrms. Networks, in 
a ﬁrm-based economy, are therefore embedded in ﬁrms.
A typical Western economy develops an institutional foundation that facilitates 
autonomous individual economic actors, therefore facilitating a firm-based 
economy; Asian economies, notably Chinese, Japanese and Korean economies, 
are rooted in social and economic institutions that encourage personal ties and 
network formation.3 With different institutional settings in the societies, the 
organizational logics of the economies will be different.
This chapter provides a socio-historical analysis of the emergence of the 
network-based economy among the Chinese business communities in Southeast 
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Asia. I argue that fundamental characteristics of post-Second World War Chinese 
diaspora economic activities can be traced back to both the long history of Chinese 
business practices and to the institutional transformation of the Chinese economy 
since the turn of the last century. Modern organizational logics of the economy 
developed in Mainland China beginning in the early twentieth century, and 
spread overseas along with the development of overseas Chinese communities.4 
While local factors were also crucial in shaping particular business strategies of 
overseas Chinese in different Southeast Asia countries, their general practices 
were inﬂuenced by Mainland China (Limlingan 1986). After all, we can see a 
general pattern of business practices from the Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast 
Asia that are consistent with practices in other Chinese communities, including 
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
I will ﬁrst discuss the basic features of the Chinese diaspora entrepreneurial 
networks in Southeast Asia and the social mechanism behind their business 
practices. Personal trust based on social norms, rather than contracts backed by a 
legal system, is the key component of these very adaptive entrepreneurial networks, 
working both within and among Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. I will 
then illustrate the socio-historical origin of the network-based capitalism created 
in China. The origin of this network economy can be traced back to the late Qing 
economy in the nineteenth century. The institutional transformations initiated by 
the introduction of Western corporate forms during that time eventually changed 
the economy – they transformed traditional business networks by preparing the 
business community for a fundamental structural change, and through the process 
created a new setting for the rise of Chinese entrepreneurship. Rather than being 
replaced by the economic mechanism of Western capitalism during the transition, 
the use of personal networks survived by reinventing itself, and has since remained 
a vital element of the overseas Chinese economy.
Chinese Diaspora Business Networks in Southeast Asia
Ethnic-speciﬁc networking as a business strategy can be found in many societies 
where overseas Chinese are conducting economic activities. Research indicates 
that ethnic ties among overseas Chinese are particularly crucial in capital formation 
and information ﬂow (Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996). While the impact of this 
ethnic-based networking among Chinese can be found in many places around 
the world,5 the role of Chinese capital and its contribution to local economies in 
Southeast Asia has attracted particular attention since the 1980s (Lim and Peter 
1983).6
Being referred to as the ‘Lords of the Rim’ (Seagrave 1995), ‘Merchant Princes’ 
(Hodder 1996) and ‘Essential Outsiders’ (Chirot and Reid 1997) of Southeast 
Asia, it is undeniable that overseas Chinese have made their mark in this part of 
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the world. The Chinese played a leading role in the economic life of different parts 
of Southeast Asia as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Trocki 
1997; Yoshihara 1988). Economic activities in Southeast Asia have since then 
proliferated largely because of Chinese settlement in the region. In recent years, 
elite Chinese entrepreneurs in East and Southeast Asia have increasingly engaged 
in multi-million-dollar joint ventures (Redding 1995). Liem Sioe Liong of the 
Salim Group in Indonesia, Robert Kuok of the Kuok group in Malaysia, Chin 
Sophonpanich of the Bangkok Bank Group in Thailand, to name a few, have all 
contributed to the economies of the countries where they reside, and at the same 
time have formed joint ventures among each other that have contributed to the 
regional prosperity. Informal linkages between regions and countries through the 
ethnic ties of the Chinese have contributed to an integration of the economies in 
the Southeast Asia region (Peng 2002).7
This kind of inter-country economic activities would happen much less fre-
quently without the informal personal ethnic-speciﬁc ties, especially since the 
legal framework for international business transactions within Southeast Asia is 
weak (Rauch and Trindade 2002).8 The creation of these ethnic-speciﬁc networks 
is based on a social mechanism existent in all Chinese communities, to different 
extents, that guarantees the relative advantage of using personal connections as 
social capital in business transactions.9
The Social Foundation of Network Economy
A network economy is an economy that is based on personal connections backed 
by social trust; and trust is being conﬁdent that your trustee is not going to engage 
in opportunistic behaviour even though it is in his or her own best interest. A social 
trust is one that is regulated by social norms, rather than by an authoritarian third 
party, typically the government. Chinese business transactions have long been 
depended on as a trust-based, self-regulated mechanism. For centuries, Chinese 
society had developed sets of norms and rules that could guarantee an acceptable 
degree of certainty in economic transactions and which had never been replaced 
with any institutional alternative.10
Business transactions among overseas Chinese, including Southeast Chinese, 
depend on the same social foundation that has evolved in China after centuries 
of commercialization. It is a practice that is based on personal trust which allows 
non-contractual business exchange. Personal trust among Chinese is built on the 
assumption that there is a shared moral culture of honesty that is expected to be 
the ethical code of anyone doing business. To be a Chinese, or even better, to be 
someone from the same native place, is advantageous in that it assumes a mutual 
expectation of honesty between each other and therefore a good partnership.
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The reasons why Chinese businessmen prefer non-contractual rather than 
contractual relationships are not simply based on a lack of contract tradition in 
China, or the fact that there is no institutional support for the contract.11 More 
importantly, it is the availability of a social-trust mechanism that can guarantee 
the reliability of a non-contractual relationship, which in turn allows the kind of 
ﬂexibility that the Chinese businessmen may actually prefer to have as a strategy 
to tackle the ever-changing market situation. Accordingly, trust is not just for 
risk and uncertainty reduction, it is also essential for the transaction to be more 
predictable, efﬁcient and ﬂexible.
Organizational studies on inter-ﬁrm relationships suggest that the availability 
of trust can be a positive source of competitive advantage if it can be maintained 
(Barney and Hansen 1994). A trust-based transaction is supposed to be more ﬂexible 
and efﬁcient (Nooteboom et al. 1997; Uzzi 1996, 1997). In a transaction that is 
based on pre-existing guanxi – personal relationships – between two business 
parties, business decisions can be made more quickly than transactions that are 
based on contracts since an informal phone call may be all that is required to solve 
a business problem (Chen 1994; Yao 1987).12 A ‘loose’ contractual form – or even 
a verbal promise – can often be more cost-effective than a written legal form, 
provided there is a personal trust to guarantee it (Charny 1990). If the exchange is 
based on a contract rather than mutual trust, it will be less ﬂexible to change, and 
will be slower and more costly to alter the terms to respond to external ﬂuctuations 
of conditions.
This kind of ﬂexibility is signiﬁcant especially for the small- to medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises that are commonly found in East and Southeast Asia. 
Smaller manufacturers have to respond to the changing market in a quicker and 
more ﬂexible way. In order to survive, they have to be ﬂexible enough to capture 
different kinds of business opportunities. What they may prefer are business 
partners who can be ﬂexible and willing to cooperate when speciﬁc needs of 
production or services arise. The economic opportunities that are created through 
these ﬂexible and cooperative relationships are difﬁcult to replicate via markets, 
contracts or vertical integration (Uzzi 1997). The choice of ﬂexibility might be a 
rational one, but to fulﬁl this choice one has to depend on the embedded norms 
that govern the social relationships of Chinese society. Seeking ﬂexibility in a 
business transaction therefore may be less feasible in a Western context, or at least 
it requires a totally different social mechanism to achieve it.13
Particularly in overseas Chinese communities, people from the same native 
place are expected to be closer to each other than Chinese from other communities, 
as native fellows have a higher density of social connections back home. Groups 
with a high density of overlapping relationships can establish an internal 
mechanism through invisible codes of ethics to maintain a higher level of trust 
among the group members (Landa 1994). Also, the relative interconnectedness of 
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every individual with other group members will facilitate positive personal traits 
such as greater sense to exhibit reliability and sincerity among the group members, 
since if these traits are not kept, most people within the group will know it. The 
existence of groups with overlapping relationships traditionally provided some 
guarantee for those doing business within the network.14 Tongxiang, or the native 
fellows, among Chinese who share a common dialect and collective memory of 
their hometown, ﬁnd it easier to create social ties with each other.15 While their 
decisions were based on business, the fact that both Robert Kuok of Malaysia and 
Liem Sioe Liong of Indonesia are Hokkien and speak the same dialect certainly 
helped to establish the cross-border joint ventures between them.
The use of guanxi in Chinese business practices therefore facilitates inter-ﬁrm 
transactions in the Chinese business community. Rather than making transactions 
of various kinds through arm-length relationships, Chinese entrepreneurs tend to 
seek business partners whom they can trust. Networks of ﬁrms are created among 
Chinese entrepreneurs through the guanxi social logic. In the Chinese business 
context, a network is the resulting conﬁguration of a set of guanxi. It represents the 
structure of how a person relates him/herself to a group of people through personal 
connections. Chinese networks in general can be used to avoid opportunistic 
behaviour by mutual trust without using costly monitoring apparatus. For Chinese 
ﬁrms, trust-building seems to be less of an issue, although it is certainly cannot 
be said that there are no problems establishing trust among Chinese ﬁrms, as 
dishonesty happens everywhere. Trust in Chinese societies, however, as different 
from that of the West, is supported by a moral community who sees the practice 
of guanxi logic and trust as a ‘normal’ and ‘expected’ social practice among those 
who are related. Daily-life experience, which emphasizes sincerity and honesty, 
has given every individual a shared understanding of what is trust, how to be 
trustworthy and how to interpret another’s actions in terms of trustworthiness, 
even if one does not intend to practice these social conventions. This common 
cultural awareness and practice of trust has facilitated the establishment of trust 
among business partners.
The interconnectedness of Chinese ﬁrms in Southeast Asia, as in other Chinese 
communities, also becomes an essential tactic for the growth of their ﬁrms. In 
typical Chinese family firms, top management positions are always filled by 
family members, and sometimes close relatives or employees who have been 
working for the family for decades. One of the common critiques of Chinese 
business practices is the closed system of its decision-making process, which in 
turn can limit the growth of the ﬁrm. In the past, most Chinese ﬁrms were small- to 
medium-sized, and indeed were limited by their own management style. However, 
the Chinese family ﬁrms typically found in Southeast Asia have overcome their 
scale limitations by networking with other Chinese family ﬁrms, not just within 
their place of residence, but also beyond to other parts of the region (Hamilton 
1996a; 2000; Redding 1995).
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A well-established trust-based business guanxi can, therefore, serve as a preset 
channel of business transaction where both sides are willing to do business on a 
personal basis. Here we see a ‘moral’ contract in contrast to a legal one, between 
the two parties, one which represents a tacit agreement on any transaction. In 
this sense, business networks represent an extension of social networks. This 
socially-based business network then can provide access to credit, market 
information, services and trading opportunities, etc., which makes Chinese 
ﬁrms more competitive. The connections of ﬁrms turn them into much bigger 
business entities with a combination of the resources from this collection of ﬁrms. 
Family business, as the most typical organizational form of Chinese business, can 
therefore beneﬁt from this networking strategy to increase its competitiveness by 
increasing its opportunities and ﬂexibility. Personal relationships can turn into a 
direct joint-investment relationship, e.g. joint-family business, or if not, at least 
can be a supportive network for one’s business.
Chinese business networks are an extension of social networks. This social 
nature of Chinese networks is supported by the guanxi logic that every Chinese, 
including those overseas, practices on a daily base (Chung and Hamilton 2000). 
Social logic is used to maintain and strengthen business networks.16 Even though 
some may do better than others, every Chinese has the shared understanding of 
the logic on how to relate to others. On the contrary, in the American business 
community, for example, networking basically represents a learned behaviour 
with little social basis. Western business networks may also be an outgrowth of 
one’s social network, since a ﬁrm’s prior social ties can help to identify alliance 
partners and opportunities (Gulati 1998), but the social dimension ends there, the 
remainder typically being replaced by business logic. 17 Personal trust, if it ever 
exists in a typical Western context, will remain at the personal level between the 
involved parties and will not be monitored by any social mechanism.
Traditional Chinese Business Networks
These business practices and their related social dimensions can be identiﬁed 
in almost every Chinese community. The practice of network economy has a 
long history in China and can especially relate to the ‘traveller economy’ in the 
traditional Chinese economy. Merchants from all parts of the country travelled 
to different locations and did business in that location much like a diaspora 
community. They had to face a high level of uncertainty in places that were ‘foreign’ 
to them. Networks in the traditional Chinese business community were used to 
extend business opportunities, and more importantly, to stabilize the transactions. 
Merchants from the same native place who settled in the same location were 
connected together through native-place associations and professional guilds 
Social Origins of Chinese Diaspora Networks
– 293 –
where regulations would be set and reinforced to regulate the business. Traditional 
networks, while helping individuals to maximize the utilization of one’s business 
opportunities, were at the same time promoting cooperation among those who 
were linked.
Chinese Native Banks as an Example
The organization of native banks (qian zhuang) in modern China provides a 
good example of how traditional networks worked in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Chinese economy. Serving as the principal ﬁnancial institution 
in China’s advanced commercial economy during late imperial times, Chinese 
native banks were among the most traditional forms of Chinese business. Through 
an ownership analysis of all native banks in Shanghai during 1927, we can see how 
these native banks stand out as vibrant examples of how interpersonal networks 
function in a traditional Chinese business setting.18
Native banks normally provided services to a known group of merchants and 
tradesmen.19 Wealthy merchants who had some capital to invest and many good 
connections in the commercial community usually started the banks.20 Although 
a few were single proprietorships, most native banks were organized through 
partnerships of four to six people.21 In most cases partners would have no kinship 
ties among them and instead would be predominantly friends and business 
colleagues of the same native place. Reputable individuals from outside the native 
regions who possessed good business contacts, possibly linked to foreign and 
Western-style modern banks, were also involved. In Shanghai, the guild of native 
banks linked all the banks together to form an overarching ﬁnancial network that 
guaranteed and ensured the continuity of commercial transactions in the City.
A key characteristic of native-bank investment was cross-investment patterns. 
Rather than investing one’s capital in only one place, as a sole proprietor for 
instance, native banks’ investors would rather diversify their investments in 
different banks than place all their money in one bank. Partnerships created 
from such cross-investments neither created nor reﬂected a core business elite 
in each location. Rather, these partnerships represented interpersonal networks 
allowing investors to bridge multiple and distinct groups within the commercial 
community.22 Native-bank organizers would also solicit partners who could bridge 
some of the regional cleavages that existed in most immigrant urban settings.
The operating capital of the native banks was usually quite small.23 Different 
from modern Western banks which required very large pools of capital to support 
and guarantee business operations, Chinese native banks depended more on 
reputation as an asset and on personal ties as a guarantee. Partnerships in the 
Chinese native banks thus represented not only a pooling of capital, but also sets 
of relations that could potentially be tapped by each partner.
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The membership list for the Shanghai native-bank guild provides information 
on partnerships for seventy-eight native banks operated in Shanghai during 1927. 
Only ﬁve of the seventy-eight native banks were sole proprietorships. The rest 
were formed by partnerships. Because of cross-ownership, most of the banks were 
directly or indirectly linked up with each other. Representing by a line between 
two banks when there is at least one interlocking ownership, Figure 13.1 shows 
that ﬁfty of the seventy-eight native banks were linked through cross-ownership. 
This web of relations represents the personal linkages of individuals in Shanghai’s 
Source: Shanghai Native Banks Guild membership list 1927
Figure 13.1 Shanghai Native Banks Partnership Networks in 1927
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native-bank community. The linkages facilitated a very efﬁcient ﬂow of market 
information which was essential for this banking institution.
This pattern of interlocking demonstrates a collection of ‘weak ties’ to create 
an extensive interpersonal network across Shanghai’s native banks. Most of the 
interlocks are singular, i.e. no more than one partner has cross-investment in the 
same two banks and there appear to be no family groups represented among the 
interlocks. Rather than forming into one closed group, native-bank investors 
extended their connections by linking themselves directly and indirectly to 
multiple groups of people which in turn provided the foundation for native banks 
to operate as a ﬁnancial system.
The system, which functioned without the intervention of state ofﬁcials or the 
state’s legal framework, worked quite well until after the Second World War.24 
Partnerships were made on the basis of unlimited liability, and bank loans were 
unsecured. The entire system operated on the basis of reputation: the banks’ 
reputations, the partners’ reputations, and the borrowers’ reputations or that of their 
guarantors.25 The system worked because the entire commercial community acted 
as third-party monitors backing every transaction. Information about misdeeds on 
the part of merchants or banks would circulate throughout the community, making 
it impossible to do business again in the community.
Since trust among banks was so important for the maintenance of the efﬁciency 
and stability of this traditional financial institution, native banks relied on a 
collective mechanism to guarantee the trustworthiness of the system: the local 
association of native bankers. Associational membership was monitored closely. 
To be a member of the guild, a bank needed to invite a person of high prestige 
within the community to serve as its guarantor. One’s native-place origin was also 
very important. While there was never a rule restricting anyone from entering 
the business, the majority of the native banks’ owners were from Ningpo and the 
surrounding areas. Ties based on native-place origin were certainly used as a tool 
to monitor and control this high-risk business.
Personal ties served at least one more function for native banks. When a bank 
began to run out of cash, for example when it issued more bank notes than it could 
afford to clear, the bank would have to ask for help from other banks with which 
they maintained connections. Personal ties helped to establish these ‘strategic 
alliances’ so that the amount of operating capital could be minimized and the 
chance of long-term survival maximized.
The nature of the traditional economy as illustrated here is that networks 
represent a web of mutual trust across a group of interrelated people. This web 
serves as a web of capital and information ﬂow on the one hand, but also as a 
vehicle to exercise control and regulation from which the larger group can beneﬁt. 
There was no centre within this kind of network. While there were merchants who 
were doing better than others, they were still supposed to be subordinate to the 
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broader networks that encompassed people from the same native place, or people 
doing the same business. The operation of the native bank illustrates that personal 
ties were necessary for a merchant to get into the bank business, but the same ties 
also acted as a constraint on one’s business conduct. So long as one was a member 
of the guild, one was supposed to conform to the rules and regulations set by the 
group. The networks in a traditional business community therefore performed 
the function of guaranteeing the stability and functioning of the business through 
which conformity to the group norms could be reinforced.
What we ﬁnd among contemporary overseas Chinese communities, however, 
is a rather different kind of network. Originating from the traditional mode, the 
‘modern’ network has become more ‘personal’. Individual entrepreneurs, while 
attached to the networks, now can have more personal inﬂuence on how these 
networks will be created. These are not networks above individuals; rather, 
these are networks over which individuals have more control. I argue that this 
personalization of Chinese business networks was largely a result of the adoption 
of Western corporate forms, which eventually became an institutional device 
for individual entrepreneurs to consolidate their social capital into one legally 
independent entity.
The Transformation of the Traditional Chinese Economy
One could argue that the reason why contemporary Chinese are still using personal 
networks in economic transactions is that the Chinese economy has never been 
‘modernized’. Economic and legal institutions which are comparable to those in 
the West have never developed well. The continuous use of personal networks 
results from the fact that better alternatives do not exist. While this has some truth, 
the Chinese economy did transform itself by following a Western model with 
the development of Western-style institutions. The traditional business networks 
described above began to change gradually in the early twentieth century when 
Western ideas of business organization were more widely adopted.
Since the mid-1800s, foreign economic invasion had been progressively 
destroying the traditional economic system in China (Richardson 1999). Foreign 
goods were replacing traditionally domestic-made goods in many major sectors 
(e.g. textile). Foreign companies, involved at the beginning mostly in trading 
and ﬁnance but later on also in manufacturing, increased in number over time 
and put tremendous pressure on China’s economy. This extreme competition had 
stimulated enormous discussion among the government, intellectuals and the 
business community in China, and had fostered tremendous institutional changes 
(most of which can be described as Westernization) in the economy which had 
never occurred before in Chinese history.
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In the late nineteenth century, there was a shared belief in China that in order 
to increase national strength, commerce had to be developed and modernized, and 
in order to develop commerce, the economy should be organized under Western-
style corporate forms (Guo 1995; Zhu 1996). In order to compete with their 
foreign counterparts, Chinese merchants mobilized to join together and establish 
gongsi (company). The introduction of corporate forms into China, especially the 
corporate form with limited liability, constituted a key landmark on the capitalistic 
transformation of the country’s economy. The early stages of Chinese capitalism 
can therefore be characterized partly by the ways Chinese merchants reorganized 
themselves into companies in order to capture capital and to regain control of 
the national market. New business and organizational concepts such as the board 
of directors, shareholders, the general meeting, and limited liability, etc. were 
introduced into China and gradually changed the contours of commercial life in 
China.
China Incorporated
The result of this institutional transformation in the economic sector, however, 
was not as progressive as expected, and one could argue that the introduction of 
corporate forms and the related institutional transformation (e.g. legal reform) 
were not very successful. In terms of the number of ﬁrms registered as companies 
under the company law, the transformation was not signiﬁcant. Between 1904, 
the ﬁrst year of the promulgation of the ﬁrst Chinese company law in China, and 
1912 (end of the Qing Dynasty), the total number of registered companies was less 
than 200. There were only 1,185 more companies registered as limited companies 
between 1912 and 1927 (Shanghai Municipal Archives 1996). Compared with 
what happened in Britain, for example, where thousands of companies registered 
in the ﬁrst few years after the liberalization of the limited-liability company and 
have increased rapidly in number since then, China did not experience such rapid 
growth in company establishment after the introduction of company law and there 
was no immediate effect on the organization of the Chinese economy.
However, when we look at the history of the emergence of corporate forms in 
the West, it appears that it actually took a few centuries for the company form to 
mature and become accepted by the public. It took about two hundred years for 
the joint-stock company to develop before it ﬁnally acquired its legal status in the 
1800s and further developed into its mature form (Scott 1910). Without a long 
tradition of joint-stock business operation in China, it is only reasonable to expect 
that the Chinese would take some time to accommodate to, and to understand, this 
new institution before they would be more willing to adopt it.
Based on the statistics that are available, however, it is clear that a transformation 
of how business was organized did indeed happen in China, and that the sort of 
Waikeung Chung
– 298 –
capital accumulation which characterized a modern economy did occur over time. 
Table 13.1 shows that there was an increase in the size of corporations’ capital size 
from 1915 to 1920. Companies with a capital size of more than 1 million yuan 
(the Chinese currency at that time) composed only 2.3 per cent of all registered 
companies in 1915, but had jumped up to 8.6 per cent in ﬁve years.
Table 13.1 Percentage Distribution of Investment Capital Size in Corporations (in yuan)
 10,000– 50,000– 200,000– 500,000– 1,000,000  Total
 50,000 200,000 500,000 1,000,000 and above
1915 31.9% 57.8% 6.0% 2% 2.3% 100%
1920 24.4% 49.6% 12.4% 5% 8.6% 100%
Source: Chen (1989: 261) (modiﬁed)
The global economic conditions during the First World War were very favourable 
to China. Institutional reform had beneﬁted from this and had created a ‘golden 
age’ for Chinese capitalists (Bergère 1989). Accumulation and investment in the 
‘new economy’ – the industrial production – had increased a few fold in less than 
a decade (especially between 1914 and 1921; see Table 13.2).
Table 13.2 Rate of Increase in Private Industrial Investment (in 10,000 yuan)
Industry 1913 1921 Growth Rate Average Annual 
   (%) Growth Rate (%)
Cotton Spinning 1,423 9,842 691.6 27.35
Flour 885 3257 368.0 17.69
Silk Reeling 1,603 2253 140.6 4.00
Tobacco 138 1,680 403.2 15.13
Cement 294 746 308.8 12.34
Matches 294 746 308.8 12.34
Total 4,628 18,658 403.2 19.04
Source: Huang and Yu (1995: 114) (modiﬁed)
While the statistics indicate that the total number of companies established per 
year was not impressive, they do suggest that the limited liability company was 
the most preferable organizational form. More than 70 per cent of those who 
registered between 1929 and 1935 were in this form. Even more signiﬁcant is 
that the capital size of the limited-liability company was always much larger 
than that of other corporate forms. We can therefore argue that even though most 
economic activities were still conducted through traditional partnership or sole 
proprietorship, a signiﬁcant percentage of national capital was incorporated.
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The Emergence of Chinese Entrepreneurs
The way that the Chinese business community was organized started to experi-
ence changes at about the same time as the 1904 Company Law was ofﬁcially 
introduced to the public. While traditional merchant organizations continued to 
exist for a longer time, new forms of business associations began to emerge at the 
turn of the century. The major change was the transformation of traditional busi-
ness associations into modern, Western business associations like the Chamber 
of Commerce.26 One of the later developments of the Chambers of Commerce in 
China was the further relaxation of membership criteria. This change signalled the 
emergence of relatively independent economic actors in the Chinese economy.
The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, as the most influential 
chamber of commerce in early twentieth-century China, gives us a representative 
example of this change. Its membership at the beginning was composed mostly 
of traditional merchants with gentry-status from different places of origin and 
different businesses. With representatives from only a few key Chinese enterprises, 
most of the members were representatives from guilds and trade associations (Xu 
and Qian 1991). In 1912, the association was reorganized into a more mature 
form – the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. One of the major changes in this 
association was that the regulations on membership had been largely revised. The 
annual membership fee was signiﬁcantly lowered from 300 taels of silver to 100 
taels which eventually led to a broadening of membership to include individual 
members outside the traditional guilds and associations. More and more enterprises 
formed as companies became members of the Chamber. Younger elites from the 
new entrepreneur class also ﬁnally took more control in this modern Western 
business association.27
The impact of the emergence of this modern form of business association 
was the breakdown of traditional organizational patterns of the economy. The 
traditional structure of the business community was organized into sectors from 
different native places and different businesses. Since most traditional businesses 
were dominated by people from a particular native place, cross-sector investment 
was not common unless it was a business that one’s fellow-regionals were also 
conducting.28 Ties between each business (and each native place) were relatively 
tight. The changing composition of the chamber of commerce reflected the 
changing structure of the economy with more and more business activities being 
conducted by individual ﬁrms, and cross-investment becoming less restricted as 
a practice. At the same time, the proliferation of the chambers of commerce in 
China at the same time at least partly led to a structural change in the business 
community. It was a transformation that signiﬁed the emergence of modern ﬁrms 
in the Chinese economy.
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As discussed previously, traditional merchants were supposed to be embedded 
in business networks rather than existing as individuals. Individual merchants 
were always recognized as part of a larger group – a bang or trade coalition. The 
social recognition of merchants in the past was based on where they were from 
or what business they were in and very little on who they were as individuals. 
Merchants from the Jin region – the Shanxi province – of China would be Jin 
merchants and were embedded in the Jin merchants’ networks. Merchants 
who traded tea would be tea merchants and were embedded in the tea traders’ 
networks. As part of a larger group, merchants were expected to be cooperative 
and not compete with each other. Rules and regulations were set by associations 
of their professions and high conformity was expected as a way to guarantee the 
stability of trade. No matter how successful the merchant was, he was expected 
to be subordinate and conform to the networks to which he belonged. Since 
business opportunities were highly constrained and regulated by guilds or trade 
associations,29 opportunities for the emergence of business elites and expanding 
businesses were rare.30
Because of the changing institutional settings in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, merchants were allowed to free themselves from traditional 
constraints and to engage in competition rather than cooperation. In contrast to 
the traditional merchants who were conﬁned to those traditional businesses, ‘new-
style’ merchants during the turn of the last century were referred to as merchants 
who invested in ‘new-style’ enterprises – manufacturing, banking and ﬁnance, 
public utilities, etc. The social consequences, however, were more than just 
alternative patterns of investment. Those who invested in these modern businesses 
were at the same time more likely to use Western corporate forms to organize their 
businesses and therefore much less likely to be conﬁned by the traditional guild-
related economy. Chu Baosan, for example, was one of those who had successfully 
transformed themselves into modern entrepreneurs by engaging in a diversity of 
modern businesses organized in Western corporate forms. He had been involved 
in forty-nine different companies, mostly as founder or co-founder, ranging from 
public utilities, mining, shipping, manufacturing and insurance to banking over the 
course of twenty-ﬁve years (Tao 2000). Liu Hongshen’s business conglomerate, as 
another example, was organized as a group of related limited-liability companies 
that had diverged investments into a wide range of modern businesses – harbour, 
matches, cement, wool spinning, coal mining, enamel, banking and insurance 
(Shanghai Shehuikexueyuan Jingji Yanjiusuo 1981). Modern corporate forms that 
assume regulation from the government rather than from the guilds had helped 
Chinese merchants to break the traditional ties which promoted more cooperation 
than competition.
Social Origins of Chinese Diaspora Networks
– 301 –
Firms as Carriers of Personal Resources
The adoption of corporate forms to establish one’s business typically occurs because 
the design allows easier capital consolidation and at the same time offers relevant 
legal protection according to company law. In China, however, the introduction 
of this Western institutional design served more than that purpose and had turned 
out to be a carrier of personal resources – a device that made personal resources 
much more effective. To a large extent, the availability of this institutional device 
facilitated the emergence of business elites in China.
It is certainly true that it was engagement in modern businesses in China 
that allowed the creation of much greater wealth for modern businessmen in 
comparison to that of those who engaged in traditional businesses. And corporate 
forms, especially the form of the limited-liability company, became the most 
obvious choice for the organization of those modern businesses, as a larger 
amount of capital was usually needed. This institutional transformation of business 
organizations, however, should be understood as a path-dependent process that 
was inﬂuenced by traditional business practices. The introduction of corporate 
forms in China had established new rules of the game in organizing business, but 
at the same time these corporate forms provided a device that allowed some of the 
traditional business practices in China to be revitalized and sustained. Corporate 
forms provided an institutional device to consolidate capital in modern China, but 
it was the direct and indirect personal connections that helped to make it possible 
(Chung 2003).
Through subscriptions of shares from the public, the limited-liability company 
allows entrepreneurs to create a much bigger enterprise than those based on 
sole proprietorship or a partnership. At the same time, by using the governance 
structure of the modern corporate form, entrepreneurs can distance themselves 
from the shareholders – the real owner – and can gain more control of the decision-
making process. Also, limited liability allows investors and, at the same time, the 
entrepreneurs to be able to spread out of their investments to more companies and 
create a much larger network.
Rather than depending solely on personal capital, a corporation with the owner-
ship divided into shares of equal value can help the entrepreneurs to create a 
ﬁrm that incorporates outsiders’ resources. In the context of China, individual 
entrepreneurs can use this ‘Western’ institutional design to consolidate resources 
that are directly or indirectly connected to oneself, with the hope that a considerable 
amount of total strangers will also be interested in investing in the corporation. 
Compared with traditional partnerships that would permit the pooling of resources 
only among a small group of people, corporate forms provide the institutional 
construct that allows more people to participate with basically any amount they 
are willing to invest.
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Because of the particular route of economic transformation in China, entre-
preneurs using Western corporate forms to organize their businesses were able 
to exercise a degree of control that would not be found in a Western context. 
Individual merchants were able to consolidate a much larger quantity of resources 
then before without the typical constraints from the guilds. Old practices governing 
interpersonal relationships continued to function, but at the same time allowed 
individual entrepreneurs to coordinate those resources in a more ﬂexible way, and 
in a way to increase one’s competitiveness in the marketplace. By relaxation of 
membership in modern business and trade associations, the transformation of the 
traditional business networks represented a broadening of the scope of possible 
connections (Rowe 1984). Geographical and professional dividing lines that used 
to exist in Chinese business communities were ﬁnally disappearing.
Since the 1920s, large business conglomerates have been formed by individual 
entrepreneurs in China through the creation of multiple personal networks by 
connecting oneself to both the traditional networks (e.g. native-bank networks) and 
a contemporary one (e.g. the industrialists’ networks) (Li 2000). The construction 
of multiple layers of networks, which would transgress native places and business 
sectors, and now companies as well, become possible in the new institutional 
setting.
The Emergence of Chinese Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks
The changes described above shed light on the changes in the institutional frame-
work in which business was being conducted in China. The emergence of cor-
porations signiﬁed the emergence of new economic actors. This implies a change 
in the business logic of the past. Capitalism developed in China, but with a 
logic different from that of the West.31 Rather than replacing traditional business 
practices in China, the Western model of business organization – the corporate 
form – was modiﬁed by being incorporated with traditional Chinese networking 
practices. The new networking practices, which maintained the same social-trust 
mechanism of the traditional model, allowed for individuals to take personal 
advantage of the network resources.
While the Western model of business organization was being adopted almost 
everywhere around the world after the Second World War, the innovative use of it 
by the Chinese can simultaneously be found in all Chinese business communities. 
Companies were set up by the Chinese according to the local company law, but 
they were at the same time connected together, in one way or another, through 
personal networks. Chinese entrepreneurs who were competent further expanded 
their businesses by using various levels of networks.
Robert Kuok of Malaysia, for example, diversiﬁed his ‘silent empire’ through 
cross-investment in many companies that were based on his personal connections. 
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As described by Cottrell (1986), his empire was composed of a group of core 
family businesses linked to an extended network well beyond the family ﬁrms 
and to a wide variety of businesses. This level of networks indicates a highly 
diversiﬁed investment strategy, representing the kinds of personal connections 
that Kuok has accumulated all these years. Cottrell (1986) has documented a very 
complex web of companies with a wide range of businesses and with all levels of 
cross-investment. While the holdings in Kuok’s core business were always high, 
with some as high as 100 per cent, the holdings of his cross-investment varied a 
great deal: many of them were less than 10 per cent, with some of them as low as 
1 per cent.32 These networks of investment were very likely the results of broad 
kinship and friendship ties, representing a way to retain all the potential business 
opportunities for further use.33
The networks continued to expand on yet another level. Chinese diaspora 
entrepreneurs, each with their own business conglomerates, teamed up to 
‘cooperate’ and to explore even more business opportunities. Redding (1995) 
identiﬁed the fact that intensive cross-border entrepreneurial networks existed 
among major ethnic Chinese diaspora entrepreneurs. Based on the companies’ 
ofﬁcial announcements, the business deals that were generated between 1990 and 
1994 by these Chinese diaspora entrepreneurial networks in Asia amounted to 
tens of millions of US dollars. The network-based economy that originated in late 
Imperial China and has been transformed since the introduction of the Western 
corporate forms has further developed into an even more vibrant system among 
the overseas Chinese societies.
Notes
1. There is much literature describing the Chinese Diaspora economy; see for 
example Brown 1995; Hamilton 1996a; Kao 1993; Lever-Tracy et al. 1996; 
Omohundro 1983; Redding 1995; Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996; Yeung and 
Olds 2001.
2. For a discussion of ﬁrm-based economy, see Biggart and Hamilton 1992. For 
a discussion of the nature of a network-based economy, see Hamilton 1996b.
3. The network-based economy, however, is not restricted to Asia. Both general 
networking and ethnic-speciﬁc networking as a business strategy are also not 
unique to the Chinese. Italian, Jews and Greeks, for example, are commonly 
identiﬁed as using personal networks for business.
4. An interesting twist that is happening now is the reverse influence of the 
overseas Chinese capitalism on the Mainland. See, for example, Lever-Tracy 
et al. 1996.
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 5. The networks of the Chinese-owned computer ﬁrms in California, United 
States, for example, is a widely mentioned example of how this ethnic-based 
business networking can create competitive advantages (Zhou 1996).
 6. While there is evidence on its signiﬁcance in the region, we should, however, 
be careful not to exaggerate the overall role of Chinese capital within each 
Southeast Asia country and for the interconnectedness of these economies. 
A more country-speciﬁc historical sociology of ethnic Chinese enterprises 
should replace the notion of a pan-Southeast Asian universalism (Gomez and 
Hsiao 2001).
 7. The smallest estimated average increase in bilateral trade in recent years in 
Southeast Asia in differentiated products attributable to ethnic Chinese net-
works is about 60 per cent (Rauch and Trindade 2002). Studies also indicate 
that Chinese ethnic business networks did not just extend regionally but also 
internationally in recent years (Yeung 1999).
 8. In Southeast Asia, however, connections with the government are just as 
important as the ethnic ties. Social capital has to be incorporated with political 
capital.
 9. Whether the use of guanxi – or personal connections – is becoming signiﬁcant 
in the growing post-socialist economy of the Mainland China is still 
controversial. See Guthrie 1999 and Yang 2002.
10. This mechanism of course will never be perfect. Merchant manuals during 
the Ming-Qing period, for example, the Jianghu Bidu (Essential Reading 
for Travellers), constantly warned merchants about all kinds of possible 
dishonesties that they might come across. How to determine who is and who 
is not honest by their appearance, by the way they talk, etc. is a common 
theme of these manuals (Chen 1997; Lufrano 1997).
11. As a matter of fact, China has a very long history of using contracts in busi-
ness transactions and other matters (Hansen 1995; Faure and Pang 1997). 
More research has to be done before reaching any conclusions, but it may 
possibly be true that the Chinese use contracts in situations where things can 
be speciﬁed, and depends less on contracts when ﬂexibility is preferred. So 
it may be wrong to say that China lacks the culture of contracts, even though 
the base of it may still be different from that in the West.
12. If a part is needed to assemble a product, one can simply call up the business 
partner with a good guanxi. No time is needed to spend to go through all the 
details, e.g. price, delivery time, speciﬁcation, etc., because one can assume 
that the best possible offer will be given (Uzzi 1997).
13. Arrighetti (1997) shows how in Western business practice, ﬂexibility beyond 
contract can actually be achieved, under some conditions, on a foundation of 
formalized contractual understandings.
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14. Traditional organizations such as lineage or native-place association in 
Chinese societies carry the same group dynamics described, and therefore 
can provide pressure on ethical conformity within the organization. In a 
contemporary context, however, it is certain that the in-group control of these 
kinds of organizations has lost most of its energy because of the weakening 
of group involvement and interpersonal bonds.
15. It is not because they are necessarily more trustworthy, but because the 
personal connection or trust is more easily established between tongxiang 
since they have either known each other for years (all coming from the same 
village or town), or they know people who have known the other side for 
years.
16. There is, however, a debate on whether Chinese social logic in business prac-
tices will eventually be replaced by Western business logic. Some suggest 
that guanxi practice will change when a more mature legal framework is 
developed (Landa 1994); others, however, maintain that Chinese business 
practices will resist change since its persistence goes beyond functional 
necessity (Tong and Yong 1998).
17. Studies suggest that Western ﬁrms depend on network relationships only 
when they are small or weaker, or those who need the beneﬁt of networking 
more, but once their corporate power increase to a certain level, they will shift 
back to market governance (Baker 1990; Podolny and Page 1998). Also, once 
the ﬁrm is bigger, it has the capacity to internalize the transaction rather than 
depending on inter-ﬁrm exchanges which are considered to be risky. Chinese 
business, on the other hand, still depends on personal relationships even after 
they are big (e.g. Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996; Yeung 1997).
18. The analysis is based on a 1927 ownership list published by the native-bank 
guild included in People’s Bank of China 1960: 264–8.
19. Native banks provided services similar to those of a modern bank, including 
services such as short-term loans, issuing guaranteed promissory notes and 
currency exchange.
20. In my sample it appears that many investors used to be opium traders or 
dyestuff merchants.
21. In a few cases, the number of partners involved was as few as two and as 
many as seven or eight.
22. Even if one family owned a bank, the family would expand its business 
by opening multiple native banks with different names and with different 
managers. For example, the Cheng family of Suzhou invested in twelve 
different banks between 1876 and 1953 through different combinations of 
family members (People’s Bank of China 1960: 738–41).
23. The average is 100,000 taels in 1927. It used to be even less in previous 
decades.
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24. Traditionally, the Chinese government always welcomed a ‘self-regulated’ 
economy so long as sufficient revenue could be generated. With limited 
administrative power, the Chinese government in the past simply granted 
exclusive rights to guilds, brokers (yiahang) or small groups of merchants 
to either control and regulate the market or to monopolize certain businesses 
(e.g. salt trade). Taxes and fees were collected from owners with exclusive 
rights rather than directly from every individual economic actor.
25. Chinese merchants consider it a disgrace if the bank requires a mortgage for 
loan. Reputation, and not property, is traditionally used as a mortgage.
26. For an excellent treatment on the transformation of business and trade 
associations in modern China, see Yu 1993. For an overview description of the 
same process in Shanghai, see Zhang 1990. For discussion on exemplars of 
other modern business organizations which were established during that time, 
see for example Bergère (1992). By 1908, there were 39 general chambers of 
commerce and 223 branch chambers established in China. By 1912, the total 
number rose to 794, and in 1915, to 1,262 (Chan 1977: 226).
27. The average age for the thirty-ﬁve directors before the reorganization in 1920 
was 57.2; the average age after the reorganization dropped to 44 (Xu and Qian 
1991).
28. Depending on how much capital they had, Hui merchants for example would 
usually be involved only in a few kinds of trade such as salt trading, tea 
trading, pawnshops, lumber, food and textiles (Wang 1997).
29. In some manufacturing sectors, for example, the number of apprentices the 
shop owner could have was set by the guild. In this case, the shop could rarely 
expand and produce more, even if more buyers could have been found.
30. The time at which business elites could emerge was usually when either a 
particular merchant or a particular bang had secured exclusive resources from 
the Imperial state. Hu Xiuyang, a prominent native-bank merchant in the Late 
Qing, became extremely rich and high-status not because of his success in 
his native-bank business which could be very proﬁtable, but largely because 
he had extensive personal connections with high-level state ofﬁcials. A lot 
of Jin merchants from the Shanxi province became very wealthy mainly 
because they were engaged in the salt trade in the earlier stage – a business 
that needed licences that were exclusively franchised by the government, and 
Piaohao at the later stage – a ﬁnancial business that involved huge amounts 
of government remittances and deposits (Zhang 1989).
31. More and more of the literature suggests that there is more than one kind 
of capitalism, each coming from a different institutional tradition. See for 
example Whitley 1999 and Guillén 2001.
32. Another ‘model’ of control adopted by the Chinese family business is to 
establish an unlimited company as a holding company and use this company 
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to ‘invest’ and to ‘own’ other limited companies – many of them being public 
companies. With the holding company as an unlimited company, the family 
does not have to disclose the family asset to the government and the public, 
while at the same time, they can use the institution of modern business 
organizations – limited-liability companies – to expand and coordinate the 
family’s business empire.
33. To invest a minimal amount of capital, in Kuok’s case some as low as 1 per 
cent, in a friend’s company is a way to maintain the guanxi between them 
that might become worthy in the future. This is also a way to expand one’s 
business by extending the web of potential opportunities with an unlimited 
boundary.
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